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Reactions
We would like to take this opportunity to thank the many people who have
sent notes and made comments complimenting our work. Most reaction we have
received from the mathematics community has been very favorable. In this volume
the editor has focused on divergent views, for instance by soliciting replies from
people named in the original article. We would also like to express our appreciation
for the care and thought that these authors have put into these replies, and for the
opportunity to respond to them in the same spirit. We received some other reactions
from physicists, see the response of Friedan, but we would like to emphasize that
the article was not addressed to physicists doing physics. A style of working which
may be counterproductive in mathematics may be totally appropriate in physics;
this is an entirely different matter. Our article was addressed to mathematicians
and to physicists who want their work considered as mathematics. In any case, a
dialog has begun.
Terminology
Perhaps the most frequent objection to our paper is not to the substance, but
rather to our use of the term “theoretical”. A primary objective of our paper
was to welcome and celebrate speculation. To do this, we required a term with
both dignity and resonance. “Speculator” did not seem to be such a word, nor
was “conjecturer”. We felt that “theoretical mathematician”, with its evocation of
“theoretical physicist” but with its clear identification with mathematics, satisfied
these criteria. We agree there is a discrepancy between our use of “theoretical” to
mean “speculative” and the well-established mathematical use of “theory” to refer
to a coherent body of knowledge. But our main motivation was that we could not
find another term with similar qualities.
The value of conjecture
Most people correctly read our paper as positive about speculation and designed
to enhance it. Some, like Mac Lane, were concerned that we had gone too far. A
few, like Atiyah, read it as hostile to conjecture. We certainly agree with him that
suppression of speculation would condemn mathematics to “an arthritic old age”.
But we do not see that calling it by its true name, or explicitly acknowledging that
it is incomplete, would have this effect.
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Along the same lines, we appreciated Thom’s remark that “rigor” reminds one
of the phrase “rigor mortis”. There is a very real sense in which mathematics which
has been successfully rigorized is dead, and the real life is, as Atiyah suggests, in
speculation. We might think of mathematics as a tree: only the leaves and a thin
layer around the trunk and branches are actually “alive”. But the tree is supported
by a large literature of published “dead” wood. Our position is that material should
be really sound before being allowed to die and to be incorporated into the wood.
In this image the “self-correcting nature of science” is that if too much rotten wood
is published then the branch falls off and the tree starts over.
Who cares?
It is evident that few of the responders have themselves been bothered by the
problems we describe. Where, then, is the problem? Gray suggests “all those who
work away from the main centers of research are disadvantaged.” “Away” here
should include time as well as space, to encompass those who use the mathematical
works from previous generations. Further, there are mathematicians of such power
and insight that they have no difficulty evaluating new work, extracting value, and
discarding errors and chaff. Everyone else is disadvantaged. The large majority of
mathematicians, as well as nonmathematicians who use mathematics, rely on the
literature. This issue may be one of the rare occasions when the leadership offered
by some of the mathematical elite is inappropriate for average mathematicians.
The effect on students
We wrote that students might be adversely affected by the problems we discussed.
Atiyah and Uhlenbeck, among others, seemed to interpret this as suggesting that
students should be warned away from areas of speculation (and excitement). This
was not our intent. We both sought out such areas as students and have no regrets.
Rather, it is a question of generally accepted standards, goals, and role models.
We suggest it is a dangerous thing for a student who does not understand the
special character of speculative work to set out to emulate it. Unless the student
has extraordinary talent, this will work out poorly.
Research Announcements
Many people accept our premises, arguments, and other conclusions but balk at
the conclusion that published research announcements prior to the existence of an
article are unwholesome. We reiterate that we make no objection to the circulation
of research announcements to inform or to establish priority. We object only to
their official publication. This conclusion came as a shock to us too: at the time
one of us was Research Announcements editor for the Bulletin and had a strong
commitment to the format. But we found that the understanding we developed
compelled this conclusion.
The main argument in support of announcements is that they have proved them-
selves in practice. But the world is changing rapidly, and the experiences of the past
must be extrapolated into the future very carefully. In particular electronic com-
munications are certain to change the nature of publication. We see announcements
as being far more problematic in this new world than they were in the old.
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Specificity and the naming of names
We were taken to task by several respondents for limiting our discussion of the
mathematics-science interaction to theoretical physics. Certainly it is true that
there are profound interactions in other areas, but we chose to focus our discussion
for three reasons. First, the activity in the specific area is unusual in quantity and
quality. As Atiyah puts it, “It involves front-line ideas both in theoretical physics
and in geometry.” Second, we both have direct experience with interactions in this
area. Third, we felt it important to be specific. An argument with some detail in a
specific context seems to us to be better than vague generalities or widely scattered
examples. We believe that the conclusions extracted from this particular case apply
more generally.
We apologize to those who experienced discomfort because we used the names of
living mathematicians. Unfortunately some people took our mentioning of names as
a personal attack. It was certainly not intended this way. We only mentioned excep-
tionally well-known, highly regarded mathematicians with the respect of the entire
community. We thought that these people, whose contributions and reputations
are beyond question, might be discussed at a level which transcended personalities.
Reply to Thurston
Thurston wrote an extremely thoughtful response to our paper, and we hope the
readers appreciate it as much as we do. He carefully and eloquently articulated a
vision of mathematics, in some ways quite different from ours. But as he points
out, the way in which a question is phrased can greatly influence the answer. We
feel that his carefully crafted questions do lead to important insights, but they also
channel discussion away from our particular concerns.
His lead question is, How do mathematicians advance human understanding
of mathematics? This is followed by, How do people understand mathematics?
These introduce an analysis of the limitations and needs of real people and make a
convincing case that the formal language of mathematical papers is poorly adapted
to these needs. He argues that understanding would be better achieved through
other avenues, including a relaxation of the emphasis on rigor.
But understanding comes on many different levels. We believe that Thurston
describes the level of understanding a teacher might want to instill in students. It
is sufficient for appreciation but usually not for active application or further devel-
opment. Traditional papers are, as he says, a poor way to introduce a subject, but
they are the whetstones which give the final edge to mastery. And they are at least
a last resort in the learning process. Thurston himself may obtain satisfactory un-
derstanding through informal channels, but he is a mathematician of extraordinary
power and should be very careful about extrapolating from his experiences to the
needs of others.
Rigorous papers serve other functions besides education, including the way we
determine what is true and reliable. And proofs provide a source of techniques for
other problems and clues to new and unsuspected phenomena. Thurston relates his
introduction to the social aspects of knowledge and says, “This knowledge was sup-
ported by written documents, but the written documents were not really primary.
. . . Andrew Wiles’s proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem serves as a good illustration
of this, . . . The experts quickly came to believe that his proof was basically correct
on the basis of high-level ideas, long before details could be checked.” But in their
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pronouncements the experts were careful to note that only the details could be
authoritative. And sure enough, at this time (December 1993) the details are still
inconclusive. The result is still uncertain, and we might have more to learn from
this wonderfully fruitful quest. But in any case the written documents really are
primary.
Later Thurston asserts “ . . . our strong communal emphasis on theorem-credits
has a negative effect on mathematical progress,” since it obscures and impedes the
team aspect of mathematics. This is one of our points too; theoretical mathemati-
cians in particular must recognize they are part of a team, not the whole show, and
must be willing to share credit.
Clearly Thurston has identified real weaknesses and needs in the educational,
social, and communication aspects of mathematics. But his analysis is not the
whole story. He has steered the discussion away from what seem to us to be key
issues, particularly the importance of “truth in advertising” in the publication of
research and the ultimate goal of proof in the written record. Curiously, we feel
that his analysis may apply better to sciences other than mathematics, where the
tools for establishing reliability are far less effective than in mathematics. But it
seems to us that even in mathematics when his conclusions are limited to education
rather than research, they are complementary to and compatible with ours.
